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The Czech Republic entered into its first COVID-related state of emergency on 12
March 2020. A year has passed – of which the country spent 225 days in a state
of emergency and 140 days in an emergency-free ‘summer break’. During the past
year, the country has had three ministers of health, four states of emergency (one of
them unconstitutional), several judicial interventions, and a brand-new Pandemic Act
which should be triggered as soon as the state of emergency comes to an end.
As a preliminary point, it should be pointed out that the government has been ruling
without majority support in the Chamber of Deputies (‘Chamber’, the lower house
of Parliament). The country is thus governed by executive measures rather than
legislative acts, which may be seen as problematic in a parliamentary democracy,
especially if this state persists for a number of months, rather than just for a short
period of emergency. In the early stages of the pandemic, executive aggrandizement
was justified by the need for efficiency and promptness. One year later, reasonable
suspicion is well-founded.
This blogpost analyses the Czech situation from the perspective of the rule of law
requirements and identifies two main deficiencies: a significant and long-lasting shift
of power to the executive, and an ostentatious lack of reasoning of the executive
crisis measures. Fortunately, these ‘two tales of executive arrogance’ have been
somewhat counterweighed by the legislature and the judiciary.
First, the successive declarations of states of emergency have received hesitant
support from the Chamber, often in exchange for political promises which remained
unfulfilled. At some point, the Chamber refused to consent to another extension of
the state of emergency. When the government declared a new state of emergency
nevertheless, the Chamber annulled it.
Second, in its executive rulemaking, the executive has not bothered to accompany
its measures with persuasive (or any) justification. This could not happen if the
measures were legislative. This lack of reasoning has been criticised by courts.
After a hesitant take-off, the judiciary seems to have finally assumed its role as an
overseer of the executive’s actions.
Who Does What? – A Quick Revision
In my previous blogpost, I introduced the two types of executive measures.
Government crisis measures are adopted as ‘other legal acts’ reviewable by the
Constitutional Court on the proposal of privileged applicants only. They are issued
pursuant to the Crisis Management Act (‘CMA’) and require a state of emergency.
Measures adopted by the Ministry of Health (or other authorities, e.g. regional
health stations) are ‘hybrid measures’ challengeable by individuals and reviewable
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by administrative courts. They are issued pursuant to the Act on the Protection of
Public Health (‘APPH’) and do not require a state of emergency. Can we say that
‘under normal circumstances’ public health crises are handled by the Ministry of
Health but once a state of emergency is declared, the government takes over? The
Municipal Court in Prague thought so (judgment of 23 April 2020) but the Supreme
Administrative Court disagreed (judgment of 26 February 2021) as there is no legal
basis for such primacy of government measures in a state of emergency. Thus, it
seems that the government and the Ministry can act in parallel, producing two types
of measures reviewable in different procedures. Furthermore, the new Pandemic Act
foresees a new type of measures, issued by the Ministry of Health or by a regional
health station, after obtaining consent from the government. These measures will be
reviewable in administrative judiciary (§ 13).
The First Tale of Executive Arrogance: Successive
States of Emergency
The first state of emergency had its own blogpost. On 30 September 2020, the
government declared a second state of emergency which began on 5 October
and was extended five times, always with a prior consent of the Chamber. Without
a stable majority in the Parliament, the minority government always struggled to
find support for another extension and had to offer favours in return. Interestingly,
the government always asked for an extension of 30 days but the Chamber usually
granted a shorter period – which is both politically significant and procedurally
problematic.
When the government asked the Chamber to consent to a sixth extension of the
state of emergency on 11 February 2021, the Chamber refused. By then, not only
had the government obviously failed to handle the pandemic but it also failed to
present any plausible strategy for the future. It had also ignored the opposition’s
attempts to discuss alternative options, such as the adoption of a Pandemic Act
which would allow to handle the situation without the need for a state of emergency.





The government, however, was determined to keep the country in a state of
emergency to retain its aggrandised executive powers following therefrom.
A loophole was found: pursuant to Article 3(5) of the CMA, heads of regional
governments can ask the government, under certain conditions, to declare a state of
emergency. After an intense (Sun)day of negotiations on the last day of the state of
emergency, all 14 heads of regional governments agreed to the dubious plan and on
14 February 2021 the government declared, upon request of the heads of regional
governments, a (third) state of emergency that began on 15 February, immediately
after the previous one.
This loophole, however, was unconstitutional.
The CMA indeed empowers the heads of regional governments to ask the
government to declare a state of emergency. The government, however, cannot
do so without limits. From the perspective of the constitutional order, it remains
irrelevant whether the government acts of its own motion or upon request by the
heads of regional governments. The government may declare a state of emergency
for a period of maximum 30 days; any extension requires a prior consent of the
Chamber. In this case, the state of emergency had been extended five times, had
lasted for 133 days, the Chamber had explicitly refused another extension and the
state of emergency ended on 14 February. The government’s declaration of the third
state of emergency was thus an obvious circumvention of the constitutional limits of
its powers. (The Constitutional Court later confirmed this in its decision Pl. ÚS 12/21
where it stated, obiter dictum, that if the CAS provides that the government may
declare a state of emergency for a period of 30 days and that this period may be
extended only after the Chamber consents to it, it is not possible to extend the state
of emergency in another way. Unless there is a change in relevant circumstances,
it is not possible to declare a “new” state of emergency if the “original” state
of emergency has come to an end and the Chamber has not consented to its
extension.) On 18 February, the Chamber annulled this dubiously declared state of
emergency with effect from the day of entry into force of the anticipated Pandemic
Act but at latest on 27 February (which happened to be the day when the Pandemic
Act entered into force). In the meantime, on 23 February 2021, the Municipal
Court in Prague ruled in favour of a teenage applicant who challenged his school’s
online courses and asked for offline education instead. This administrative court’s
ruling stemmed from the unconstitutionality of the government’s actions. After the
government had declared the third state of emergency, it issued follow-up crisis
measures, including the one which demanded that schools keep their premises
closed and continue teaching their courses online. The precondition of this crisis
measure, however, was a state of emergency declared pursuant to the constitutional
requirements. The court argued:
‘With regard to the immediate follow-up of the [present] state of emergency
after the [previous] state of emergency, and given that the reasons for the
declaration of both states of emergency are formulated utterly identically
[…], the court has concluded that the [present] state of emergency is
not a new state of emergency but rather a de facto continuation of
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the [previous] state of emergency, declared against the will of the
Chamber of Deputies which has not consented to the extension of the
previous state of emergency, as required by Art. 6(2) of the CAS. […] With
regard to this, the continuation of the state of emergency after 15 February
2021 contravenes the constitutional order.’
(This first-instance judgment was immediately challenged before the Supreme
Administrative Court by the defendant school which also applied for an interim
measure. This interim measure was granted and the school did not have to open
its gates in the peak of the pandemic. The decision of the Supreme Administrative
Court on the merits of the case is pending.)
On 24 February, the government made an unprecedented request: it asked the
Chamber for an extension of the third state of emergency, and requested that the
Chamber revoke its decision by which it annulled that state of emergency. The
Chamber discussed this request on 26 February and – unsurprisingly – did not meet
the government’s wishes.
On the same day, the Parliament adopted the long-awaited Pandemic Act effective
from 27 February 2021. Its main purpose is to enable the country to deal with
the COVID-pandemic without a state of emergency. However, due to an adverse
aggravation of the epidemic situation (new mutations, record numbers, etc.), the
government persuaded the Chamber that it needed another state of emergency
which would enable it to adopt radical measures for a period of three weeks,
including a severe restriction of mobility on the territory. Therefore, upon explicit
invitation by the Chamber, the government declared a (fourth) state of emergency,
foreseen to last from 27 February to 28 March 2021. This fourth state of emergency
was extended again on 26 March and is foreseen to last until 11 April.
The Second Tale of Executive Arrogance:
Unreasoned Executive Measures
During a significant majority of the past year, the executive enjoyed its aggrandised
powers subject to a very limited scrutiny not only by the legislative branch but also
by the judiciary. Looking back at the previous year, the courts have not yet annulled
a measure for substantive reasons; all the annulled measures were unlawful due to
lack of reasoning. Let’s consider 3 representative examples.
On 20 October 2020, the Municipal Court in Prague declared unlawful the closure
of universities by the Prague hygiene station. Although the challenged executive
measure included a detailed description of the deteriorating epidemic situation in
Prague and clearly formulated the legitimate aim to slow down the spread of the
virus, it failed to explain why universities needed to be closed while kindergartens,
primary and secondary schools, but also restaurants and bars remained open. (Yet,
all universities remained closed nevertheless.)
On 13 November 2020, the Municipal Court in Prague declared unlawful the
measures of the Ministry of Health on the obligation to wear face masks. The court
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emphasised it did not consider the measure disproportionate, nor were the judges
opposed in principle to a rule commanding people to wear face masks. However, the
challenged measure could not be subjected to judicial review because it lacked any
meaningful justification. The Ministry had toughened the measures while repeating
the same justification: that face masks were more important indoors than in the open
air. Such a justification, however, could not explain the obligation to wear a face
mask while standing at a bus stop or walking in the streets, which is exactly what the
Ministry measures required. (Just like with universities, the measure was replaced by
another one and the obligation to wear masks remained in effect.)
The carelessness in offering justification for crisis measures led to the first (and
so far only) decision of the Czech Constitutional Court on the merits of the COVID
crisis. After many self-restrained rulings in which it refused to go into the heart of the
matter, the Court finally issued a ruling (published on 22 February 2021) by which
it annulled the government’s crisis measures for their absolute lack of justification.
According to the Constitutional Court, ‘in a state governed by the rule of law, it is
unthinkable that any act issued by a public institution and capable of restricting
fundamental rights would not be rationally and persuasively reasoned, or that its
reasoning would not be available at least in the course of the subsequent judicial
review.’
In the past couple of weeks, following the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the executive
bodies seem to have learned a lesson and they have shown attempts to justify their
measures. It remains to be seen whether the judicial intervention will bear fruit in a
long-term perspective.
Conclusion and Outlook
From the rule of law perspective, the two tales of executive arrogance are worrying,
especially in their combination. Luckily, the legislature has (hopefully) managed
to curtail the executive by adopting the Pandemic Act and the judiciary has finally
shown its willingness to annul executive measures if they are not reasoned.
In his (offline!) lecture of 14 December 2020, Jan Wintr analysed the executive crisis
measures from the perspective of Lon Fuller’s principles of the ‘inner morality of law’,
i.e. the eight requirements that rules should be general, promulgated, prospective,
clear, non-contradictory, not impossible, constant, and appropriately enforced;
concluding that the Czech executive managed to breach all eight principles. In fact,
one could suspect that the government’s lawyers made a bet whether it was possible
to breach all eight Fuller’s principles at once. While some of these failures may
be justified by the extraordinary situation, one of them cannot: an absolute lack of
reasoning of the measures.
Justification of adopted measures is one of the fundamental requirements of the rule
of law; it allows the addressees of a measure to comprehend its purpose, prevents
arbitrariness in decision-making, and makes judicial review possible. Unreasoned
rules imply indifference, detachment, or arbitrariness of those at power.
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For the remainder of 2021, Czech citizens should hope for a better political culture
of justifying the crisis measures, for a well-functioning crisis management under the
new Pandemic Act, for an effective vaccination policy, and for no further political and
constitutional complications on our road to the (endangered?) elections in October
2021.
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